



Macmillan's Role in Resolving International Crises (1958-1962) (Selected Models)

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Abstract:

Several international crises erupted in which British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan played a distinguished role, especially the second Berlin crisis 1958-1960, as he had an important role in easing tensions through his visit to Moscow Especially after the situation worsened and the Soviet Union attempted to end the Potsdam Agreement regarding the situation in Berlin and negotiate to make it a free city, while in the Cuban crisis he played an advisory role because of Cuban-Soviet rapprochement created a political crisis with the United States of America, which prompted the McMillan government to intervene in order to achieve rapprochement and prevent the outbreak of war between the two parties in Cuba. The Macmillan government's loss of its nuclear power made it dependent on the United States of America to supply it with weapons under the Sky bolt Agreement and to sell it Sky Bolt missiles In the Skybolt crisis, the relationship between the United States of America and McMillan government was weakened due to the abolition of the concession of the nuclear weapons Bluestreak project, on which Britain relied on possessing nuclear weapons, but because of the close relationship between Macmillan and US President Kennedy, the crisis was quickly resolved and the signing of the agreement 1962.

Keywords: Macmillan, International crises, Britain and cold war

**دور ماكميلان في حل الازمات الدولية ١٩٦٣-١٩٥٨ نماذج مختارة****م.م. هنادي اسماعيل ابراهيم****أ.د. حسين حماد عبد**

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**الملخص:**

اندلعت عدة ازمات دولية كان لرئيس الوزراء البريطاني هارولد ماكميلان دوراً مميزاً فيها لاسيما ازمة برلين الثانية ١٩٥٨-١٩٦٠ اذ كان له دور هام في تخفيف حدة التوترات من خلال زيارته لموسكو ، اما في الازمة الكوبية كان دوره استشارياً ، كادت ازمة سكاى بولت ان تضعف العلاقة بين الولايات المتحدة الامريكية وبريطانيا بسبب الغاء امتياز مشروع صاروخ بلو ستريك الذي اعتمدت بريطانيا في امتلاكها السلاح النووي لكن بسبب العلاقة الوطيدة بين ماكميلان والرئيس الامريكي كينيدي تم حل الازمة بصورة سريعة .

**الكلمات المفتاحية :** ماكميلان، الازمات الدولية، بريطانيا، الحرب الباردة**Introduction**

Macmillan played a distinguished role in foreign policy, as he played an important role in international crises. His efforts enabled him to obtain a preliminary agreement from Khrushchev to stop nuclear tests and hold a summit meeting in 1959. He was able, Depending on his good relationship with Kennedy, He was to obtain the concession to purchase a Polaris missile under the Nassau Convention. The importance of the research lies in knowing how Macmillan faced these crises through his political relations? How was a settlement reached? Through the holding of treaties with international parties. The reason for choosing this topic is to shed light on the international crises that faced Macmillan, who with his political intelligence managed to end them in cooperation with European countries and the United States of America. The topic of the research focused firstly on the second Berlin crisis in 1958 with the beginning of Macmillan's assumption of the premiership in 1957, which is an important stage for Britain. The research followed the historical events that were in sequence, therefore some questions were raised which are:

- 1- How did Macmillan face the Berlin crisis?
- 2- What is Macmillan's role in reaching a solution to the crisis?
- 3- Why did Macmillan have an advisory role in the Cuban crisis?
- 4- What was Macmillan's relationship with the United States of America during the Sky bolt crisis?

For this reason, the research plan was put into three topics and research Conclusion, The first topic dealt with Macmillan and the second Berlin crisis (1958-1960), while the second topic discussed Macmillan's Role in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The third topic included the Skybolt crisis and the 1962 Nassau Agreement. At the end of the study, there is a conclusion and list of references.

### **The first topic: Macmillan and the second Berlin crisis (1958-1960)**

After the end of World War II in 1945, Germany was divided according to the Yalta Conference<sup>(1)</sup> into four regions. This decision was confirmed in the Potsdam Conference, which was held from July 17 to August 12, 1945. Nine meetings were held in it and several discussions were discussed. The most important topic is the German issue. It was decided to disarm Germany, remove the militaristic spirit, control the arms factories, and get rid of the Nazi Party<sup>(2) (3)</sup>.

It was decided to divide Germany into two regions: West Germany for the Allies and East Germany for the Soviet Union. In order to strengthen West Germany, the Allies held the London Conference in June 1948, in which it was decided to establish the Federal Government of West Germany<sup>(4)</sup>, but this did not satisfy the Soviet Union, which imposed a siege on West Berlin on March 31 1948<sup>(5)</sup>. Thus it violated the air corridor agreement it had with the Allies in November 1945, which provided for the allocation of three air corridors Hamburg, Berlin and Hanover<sup>(6)</sup>.

However, the Allied forces (Britain, America and France) responded to this blockade by establishing an air bridge on June 26,

(1) Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1970.

(2) Dietrich Orlow, The History Of The Nazi Party :1919-1933, University of Pittsburch Press, 1969.

(3) Ceophnk Aokumentobm The Tehran Yalta and potsdam Conferences Documents, The Union of Soviet Socialist Repubiis , Moscow 1969, P.321 .

(4) Kitty Newmanm , Macmillan Khrushchev and The Berlin Crisis 1958-1960 Routledge, London and New York, 2007, P. 17 .

(5) Johnp. s. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1958- 62 The limits of Interests and force, Macmillan Press ltd, London, 1998. P.11 .

(6) K.RM.Short, The March of time, Time Inc. and the Berlin blockad, 1948-1949; selling Americans on the "news" Democratic Germany, Historical Journal of film, Radio and Television, Vol. 13. No4 1993, P.451 .



1948 to provide Berlin with basic materials such as food and fuel<sup>(7)</sup>. The bridge was successful in meeting the requirements of the population, as the Allied forces transported 3 million tons of food and miscellaneous materials, and the success of the bridge backfired on the Soviet region<sup>(8)</sup>, so Stalin ended the siege and reopened the roads to Berlin on May 12, 1949. Thus, the German Democratic Republic was established in May 1949, and the city of Bonn became its capital. On September 15, 1949<sup>(9)</sup>, Konrad Adenauer became the first chancellor of the Republic, and five months later Joseph Stalin responded by declaring the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany on October 7, 1949<sup>(10)</sup>. The two republics continued until the crisis renewed in 1961<sup>(11)</sup>.

### **First: The Second Berlin Crisis 1958-1960**

The period between (1949-1958) witnessed the stability of the situation between the two parties, but the situation worsened when The Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev announced in a speech he delivered at the Soviet-Polish friendship meeting in Moscow on November 10, 1958<sup>(12)</sup> that the Soviet Union wanted to terminate of the Potsdam Agreement on Berlin and thus the end of the occupation regime in Berlin. He gave a period until May 31, 1959 in order to agree to negotiate to make Berlin a free city within six months. In the event the Allies refused to negotiate, the Soviet government would sign a peace treaty with the East Berlin government to give them full control of access to West Berlin<sup>(13)</sup>.

(7) Tony Judt, Post War A History of Europe since 1945, The Penguin Press, New York, 2005, P.146.

(8) Gearson, OP. Cit., P.13. Paul Weymar, Adenauer His Authorized Biography, E.P. Dutton Company, New York, 1957. Nancy Whitelaw, Joseph Stalin From peasant to Premier, Dillon Press, New York, 1992.

(9) Judt, OP. Cit., P.147. Harris M. Lentz III, Heads of States and Governments A worldwide Encyclopedia of over 2,300 leaders, 1945 Through 1992, Routledge, New York, 2013, P. 782-783.

(10) Gearson, OP. Cit., P.34.

(11) Kathleen Paula Newman, Britain and the Soviet union. The search for an Interim Agreement on West Berlin November 1958 - May 1960, Unpublished PHD thesis, London school of Economics and Political Science, 1999, P31.

(12) Elisabeth Barker, The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) Vol.39, No 1 (Jan 1963), P.60.

(13) David G. Coleman, the Berlin Crisis of 1961 The origins and Management of a crisis, Unpublished PHD thesis The University of Queensland, 1995, P.35.



Khrushchev had several reasons behind this announcement, including the superiority of the Soviet Union in the field of space over the United States and the other reason is the economic problems in East Berlin and the increase in the number of refugees to the West, so Khrushchev considered these important reasons for ending the presence of allies in the West<sup>(14)</sup>.

In order to confirm his position, Khrushchev sent a memorandum on November 27, 1958 to the governments of Britain, France and the United States, accusing them of explicitly violating the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement through the participation of West Germany in NATO and arming the German army with missiles and nuclear weapons. So consider the London Protocol signed in September 1944 relating to the division of the territories of Germany and the Association Agreement for the Control of German Machines signed in the days of 1945 nullified<sup>(15)</sup>.

The Allies responded to the Soviet memorandum dated November 27, 1958-December 31, 1958<sup>(16)</sup>, by convening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Paris for the period from December 16-18, 1958 to discuss the international situation. The Berlin crisis was at the forefront of the important issues, as all member states rejected the proposal of Berlin as a free city<sup>(17)</sup>. which would endanger the freedom and security of the residents of West Berlin. The Allies affirmed their rights in Berlin based on the Four Powers Agreement of September 12, 1944 and May 1, 1945<sup>(18)</sup>, and not on the Potsdam Agreement as mentioned in the Soviet memorandum. The Potsdam Treaty stated that this agreement is binding on all parties, as long as it is not replaced by other agreements. The British response was on December 31, 1958 against the Soviet Union agreed with the responses of the United States, France and Germany at the Paris meeting, but the British memorandum expressed its desire to negotiate a solution to the Berlin problem

(14)Barker, Op. Cit., P.61 .

(15)American foreign policy current Documents 1958, Department of state publication 7322, Washington, 1962, p.488 .

(16)Newman, OP. Cit., P.50 .

(17)Ibid.P.91 .

(18)Brain white, Britain, detente and changing East – West relations, Routledge, London and New York, 1992, P.61 .



Macmillan played a distinguished role in easing the tensions of the crisis through his visit to Moscow in order to hold a meeting with the four foreign ministers in Geneva, as his trip was crucial in light of Khrushchev's warning crisis, but he found it difficult to convince his allies of this visit and its importance in convening the summit meeting. Therefore, he began to prepare for his visit. On December 23, he sent to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko his desire to visit Moscow for ten days<sup>(19)</sup>.

However, the Soviet government responded to his request on February 2, 1959. On February 21<sup>(20)</sup>, 1959 Macmillan began his trip, which lasted until March 3. His foreign minister, Selwyne Lloyd, traveled with him. In Moscow, he was received by Khrushchev, Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan, and Foreign Minister Andrei<sup>(21)</sup>. The reception in general was good. The two parties met and agreed that the Soviet Union would withdraw a period of six months in order for the Allies to withdraw from Berlin to make it a free city. Macmillan succeeded in postponing the period of the warning that was given to the month of May<sup>(22)</sup>.

On March 24, Macmillan returned to London and then went to Paris, Washington and Bonn, the capital of West Berlin, to inform them of the results of his visit to Moscow and try to persuade them to hold a four-way summit in Geneva<sup>(23)</sup>. However, the Allies were suspicious of Macmillan's intentions and considered his trip as electoral propaganda but in the end he was able to convince them with the meeting held on May 11, 1959 in Geneva. The meeting was attended by representatives from Britain, France, America and the Soviet Union<sup>(24)</sup>.

The meeting began with the Soviet Union making proposals, proposing a reduction in the number of Western forces, German

(19)Gearson, Op. Cit., P.58

(20)Charles Williams, Harlod Macmillan, Phoenix, London, 2009, P.331 .

(21)Barker, Op. Cit., P.64 .

(22)Nigel Fisher, Harold Macmillan A Biography, smartens, New York, 1982 , P.215 .

(23)D.R. Thorpe, Supermac The Life of Harold Macmillan ,Cantto and winds, London, 2010, P.517 .

(24)Peter Mangold ,The Almost Impossible Ally Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle, I.B Tauris Publishers , London , 2006,P.126-127.



reunification, disarmament, and free access to West Berlin<sup>(25)</sup>. On June 16, the Allied Powers responded to Soviet proposals by agreeing to reduce Western forces to 11,000 men and allow free access to West Berlin without restrictions on trade and people, but the issue of unification remained unresolved<sup>(26)</sup>.

### **Second: Macmillan and the Renewal of the Second Berlin Crisis in 1960-1961**

Prior to the Paris summit meeting scheduled for May 16, 1960<sup>(27)</sup>, the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy plane on May 1, 1960<sup>(28)</sup>, as the United States was carrying out a secret mission to discover the extent of the spread of Soviet nuclear weapons. Pilot Gary Powers was captured and sentenced to prison for 10 years<sup>(29)</sup>, despite this incident, Khrushchev did not threaten to cancel the conference, but on May 15 he sent to Macmillan, who was in Paris to prepare for the summit, asking him to make General Dwight D. Eisenhower presents an apology for the incident U-2 and undertakes not to repeat such flights<sup>(30)</sup>.

The meeting was held as scheduled, as Khrushchev launched an attack on Eisenhower, who refused to apologize<sup>(31)</sup>, but agreed only to stop flights. He proposed the principle of open skies, meaning that United Nations planes would be allowed to monitor both countries<sup>(32)</sup>, but Khrushchev rejected the proposal and asked to postpone the summit for a period of six to eight months, i.e. after The end of the Eisenhower term and he also withdrew his invitation to Eisenhower to

(25)Elis Roxburg, John F. Kennedy VS.Nikita Khrushchev: cold war adversaries, Gareth Stevens Publishing , New York ,2015, p. 22 . Doris Faber ,Dwight Eisenhower, Abelard-Schuman ,New York,1977

(26)Fisher, Op. Cit,P.250 .

(27)Frederick, kempe, Berlin 1961.Kennedy,Khrushev,and the most dangerous Placeon earth , G.P.Putnams sons, New York, 2011, P.34 .

(28)Fisher , Op. Cit., P.252 . Michael Meagher and Larry D.Gragg, John Kennedy A Biography ,Greenwood ,California,2011.

(29)Coleman Op .Cit., P. 46 .

(30)Mark Jonathan Rice, The Alliance city: Nato and Berlin, 1958-1963 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate school of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University, 2010, P.182 -186 .

(31)Barker, Op. Cit., P.69 .

(32)Gearson, Op. Cit., P.184 .



visit Moscow, after which Khrushchev left the meeting and thus the summit failed in its endeavors<sup>(33)</sup>.

Despite the failure of the summit, Macmillan's status as a statesman was high. A Gallup poll of the United States in the summer of 1960<sup>(34)</sup> showed that Macmillan's popularity reached 79%, the highest recorded for a peacetime prime minister but the crisis was renewed again during the reign of John F. Kennedy. In the Vienna summit meeting on June 4, 1961, when Khrushchev asked to sign a peace treaty for the reunification of Germany, Kennedy refused his request, but Khrushchev threatened the United States that he would sign Separate peace treaties with East Germany and become a free, demilitarized city. On June 6, Kennedy tried to persuade Khrushchev to reverse his decision, because the latter no longer feared American nuclear weapons. So Kennedy failed to persuade Khrushchev and gave his instructions to the Secretary of Defense, State and Treasury in order to increase defense spending and strengthen American units in Europe<sup>(35)</sup>, so that the West would be ready for any order. He responded to him with a strongly worded memorandum on June 17 in which he asserted that any action by the Soviet Union or Germany to cancel the Potsdam Agreement and make Berlin a free city would be met by the Allies' military response, including nuclear war. Nevertheless, the Western powers left room for negotiation.

When Khrushchev failed to achieve his goals, he began taking measures to build the Berlin Wall in order to divide Germany and also to prevent the escape of refugees from East Berlin. Therefore, on August 13, 1961, the Soviet forces began building the wall by placing barbed wire along the road, building watchtowers, and closing the border with West Berlin. The response of the allies to the construction of the wall was cold, as they were waiting for this measure, and thus the Berlin crisis of 1961 ended without a solution<sup>(36)</sup>.

### **The Second Topic: Macmillan's Role in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis**

(33)Coleman, OP. Cit., P.68 .

(34)John Griffiths, The Cuban missile crisis, Rourkeenlerprises, USA, 1987, P.32-33 .

(35)Laurie collier Hillstrom, Defining moments The Cuban missile crisis Omni graphics, USA, 2015, P.29 .

(36)Ibid, P.30 .





The Soviet-American struggle for control of Cuba after World War II led to the deterioration of the conditions that led to the Cuban missile crisis, among which were Fidel Castro's conclusion of a trade treaty with the Soviet Union in February<sup>(37)</sup>. 1960 in order to reduce Cuba's dependence on the United States. The treaty stipulated that Cuba would provide credit facilities for the purchase of agricultural and commercial equipment and machinery in return for the Soviet Union's promise to buy sugar<sup>(38)</sup>, thus giving Cuba a guaranteed market for sugar. Castro nationalized the oil refineries owned by the Americans after they refused to filter Soviet crude oil in June 1960, he reduced the Cuban sugar quota to the United States<sup>(39)</sup>.

The United States saw that the increase of Cuban-Soviet rapprochement would lead to the spread of communism throughout Latin America, so Eisenhower asked the CIA to prepare for the overthrow of the Castro regime.

On January 3, 1961<sup>(40)</sup>, Eisenhower decided that the situation had become so hostile between the two countries that they were closed down the American embassy in Havana (Havana) and the severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. To carry out this operation, the American intelligence prepared the Cuban exiles and supplied them with weapons in order to overthrow the Castro government, but on January 20, 1961 Kennedy was elected President of the United States, who followed the same policy of his predecessor Eisenhower towards the crisis<sup>(41)</sup>.

Therefore, the first attack began on April 15, 1961, as two American B26 planes bombed airports and military sites, but Castro was aware of the attack, so he changed the locations of planes and weapons, and thus the first attack failed, but Kennedy continued his plan as he ordered on 17 April 1961<sup>(42)</sup> landing of 1,400 Cuban exiles in the Nicaragua camp, on three separate beaches in the Bay of Pigs,

(37)Griffitus, Op. Cit., P.37 .

(38)Howard Jones , The Bay of figs, Oxford university Press a New York, 2008, P.1 .

(39)Jim Rosenberger, The Brilliant Disaster JFK, Castro and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs, Scribner a New York London, 2011, P.266 .

(40)Hillstrom, Op. Cit., P.31 .

(41)Ibid,P.33 .

(42)Aleksandr fursenko, Timothy Naftali, kurushchev's cold war a Norton company New York, London, 2006, P.434 .



these beaches are the Red Beach in southern Cuba, the Blue Beach, and the Green Beach, but after their disembarkation they were surrounded by Castro's forces who were learned of the invasion and his forces sank ships in order to cut off supplies and were able to shoot down American planes that were under the command of the Cuban exiles<sup>(43)</sup>.

The losses of the Cuban exiles were estimated at 114 dead and 1,100 captured. Thus, Castro was able to eliminate the operation within two days, and thus the operation planned by the United States over two years had failed, and this failure led to an international crisis between Cuba and America that will lead to a new crisis<sup>(44)</sup>.

The failure of the Bay of Pigs operation led to an increase in the popularity of Castro, who agreed with the Soviet Union to make Cuba a base for launching nuclear missiles in order to prevent Washington from controlling the island and overthrowing his regime<sup>(45)</sup>. During Khrushchev's visit to Bulgaria in 1962, he was convinced to deploy missiles in Cuba, because it serves two purposes the protection for Castro and enables the Soviet Union to confront American missiles in Turkey. The crisis began on the morning of Tuesday, October 16, when Kennedy was informed that the U-2 spy plane had taken pictures of the Soviet Union placing missiles and nuclear weapons in Cuba, and this was the beginning of the confrontation between the nuclear states that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. During the crisis, NATO countries in Western Europe realized that the United States invasion of Cuba would lead to Soviet revenge on West Berlin. Therefore, on October 19, the CIA informed the Macmillan government about the developments of the crisis through British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore. which in turn informed the Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>(46)</sup>.

During the crisis, Kennedy established an Executive Committee, known as the Excomm, which was composed of prominent members of the US government: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy and an advisor. National Security McGeorge Bundy, Chief of Staff Maxwell

(43)Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen days Amemoir of the Cuban missile crisis a w.w. Norton and company, New York and London, 1971, P.16 .

(44)Priscimea Roberts, Cuban missile crisis the Essential Reference Guida, Abc – clio, santa Barbara, California. 2012, P.178 .

(45)Kennedy, Op. Cit., P.20 .

(46)peter G. Boyle, The British Governments view of the Cuban missile crisis, contemporary British History, Vol. 10, No.3, Autumn 1996, P.23 .



Taylor and Kennedy, and others, to advise Kennedy on Cuban missiles<sup>(47)</sup>.

Since the beginning of the crisis on October 16-20, the committee has held meetings on a daily basis, and the discussions included several proposals, including the United States invading Cuba, an air strike on the missile site or imposing a blockade, but Kennedy changed his mind on the evening of Saturday, October 20, when he preferred to impose an initial blockade<sup>(48)</sup>.

On October 21, he summoned British Ambassador Ormsby to the White House before lunch because Ormsby was a close friend of Kennedy to inform him of the details of the crisis. He told him that on October 14<sup>(49)</sup> an American U-2 plane flew over Cuban territory and took pictures of Soviet nuclear missiles, and the pictures were evidence of the inaccuracy of the Soviet statements regarding the establishment of Cuba as a nuclear base<sup>(50)</sup>.

Kennedy asked for the opinion of Ormsby and his government regarding the commission's proposals and said with regard to the invasion, he said, "An invasion would be unwise at this time because few people outside the United States consider Cuban actions dangerous enough for America to attack Cuba." Regarding an air strike, Ormsby told Kennedy that the Soviet missiles so far did not pose any military threat to the United States. As for the chances of the blockade, Ormsby asked Kennedy by what right you would impose an embargo on Cuba. He responded to him under the Rio treaty, so he advised him that the siege was the best<sup>(51)</sup>.

It was agreed that he would send an official letter to Macmillan in order to inform him of the US measures, thus Macmillan would be the first foreign president to be officially informed of the crisis. This

(47)Harold Macmillan , At the end of the day 1961-1963, Harper and Row , New York and London, 1973, P. 192-193 . David W.Dent, Historical Dictionary of U.S Latin American Relations, Greenwood Press, London ,2005,P.117.

(48)Nigel J. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold way The Irony of interdependence ,Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, P. 7-3 .

(49)Richard Lamb, The Macmillan years: 1957-1963 the emerging truth John Murray, London, 1995, P.353 .

(50)Michelle, Getchell, The Cuban Missile crisis and the Cold War A short history with documents Hackett ,Publishing company, USA, 2018, P. 175 176 .

(51)National Archives, Foreign office 598/29, Cuban missile crisis: contacts Between John F Kennedy president of the lisaand Harold Macmillan ,22 October 1962 ,P.33.

was on October 21 by US Ambassador David K. Bruce. On October 22, Macmillan met Bruce, who handed him pictures confirming the intention of the Soviets to make Cuba a nuclear base, and during the meeting Macmillan stressed the necessity of publishing the pictures in order to gain popular support in Britain and Europe<sup>(52)</sup>.

Macmillan's reaction differed from that of his ambassadors Ormsby and Kennedy, as he wrote a letter to Kennedy advising him to invade Cuba, but after conversations with Ormsby, he found that the invasion was not in the interest of Britain, because if America attacked, there would be killers and wounded from the Soviets and Cubans, and this matter leads to the Soviets responding and exploiting the situation in order to gain control of Berlin, which is likely to lead to a war between the Western allies and the Soviets.

So on the 22nd of October<sup>(53)</sup>, Macmillan sent a letter to Kennedy assuring him of his support for the military and naval blockade. The Executive Committee suggested replacing the term naval blockade with the term (quarantine) because the blockade is technically an act of war, so on the same day Kennedy delivered his speech to the American people and the world in it, he said, "The United States of America found evidence confirming that the Soviet Union installed medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in Cuba"<sup>(54)</sup>.

In his speech, he specified the presence of two types of missiles, the first with a range of more than 1,500 miles and the ability to strike Washington City, the Panama Canal and Mexico City, and the second type being medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of about 2,000

(52)David A. Welch and James G. Blights, The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban' missile crisis . An Introduction to the Excomm Transcripts International Security, vol.12, No3 (winter, 1987-1988), P.4 .

(53)Christopher sandford, Harold and Jack The pemarkable friendship of Primminister Macmillan and President Kennedy, Prometheus Books, New York 2014.P. 220 .

(54)Elations of the United state 1961-1963 volume XI, Cuban missile crisis and After mating united states Government Printing office Washington, 2018 Telegram from the Embassy in the soviet union 10 the Department of states 23 October 1962 ,P.279-281 . U Thant The Search for peace, Alfred A. Knopf Inc, New York,1966. , June Bingham

miles and the ability to hit most major cities in half the western part of the globe<sup>(55)</sup>.

He also called on the leaders of the Commonwealth to stand in solidarity with Washington. The Soviet response came on October 24, 1962, when Khrushchev announced his rejection of Kennedy's ultimatum and declared that the quarantine was illegal and that it violated international standards of navigation law and could not recognize the right of the United States to impose its control over weapons<sup>(56)</sup>. He emphasized that the weapons in Cuba are in order to enhance its defense capacity and protect it from any aggression, and he hoped that the United States will be patient in its actions that would lead to an international disaster<sup>(57)</sup>.

Because of the escalation of the crisis between the two parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Uthant, presented an initiative for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. On October 24, he appealed to the leaders of the great powers, calling for a halt to military operations and proposing that the Soviet Union stop shipping weapons to Cuba and in return the United States is suspending the quarantine order for two or three weeks in order to conduct negotiations between the parties, and both parties agreed to the proposal. On October 26, 1962, Khrushchev sent his first conciliatory message, expressing his desire to settle the crisis peacefully by removing the Soviet bases in Cuba under the supervision of the United Nations, and in return the United States of America pledges not to invade Cuba and end the quarantine<sup>(58)</sup>.

Before Kennedy responded to his message, Khrushchev sent a new message on October 27, 1962, which was in contrast to his first message. He seriously requested that the United States withdraw its missiles from Turkey and pledge not to invade Cuba, and in return the Soviets would withdraw the missiles in Cuba and dismantle their bases. But Kennedy ignored his letter of October 27 and responded to his letter of October 26 because it contained only the promise of the United States of America not to attack Cuba and to remove the quarantine. On

(55)Thomas Fischer, The lrc and the 62 Cuban missile crisis, International Review of The Red cross, No. 842, 2001, P.293

(56)Thomas Fensch, The Kennedy – Khrushchev letters, New century books, Boston, 2001, P.310, 319 .

(57)Hillstrom, Op. Cit., P.185 .

(58)Kennedy, Op., Cit., P.87 .



October 27 Khrushchev sent his approval to Washington and gave orders to dismantle the missile bases in Cuba Thus, the crisis ended peacefully<sup>(59)</sup>.

### **The third topic / The Skybolt crisis and the 1962 Nassau Agreement**

Britain has relied on the United States of America to supply nuclear weapons since 1955, when the airline took the concession for the Blue Streak missile project, but in 1960<sup>(60)</sup> it was canceled for two reasons, Firstly, its location as it was easy to detect and thus being the first target for the attack, and secondly, it could not withstand 60,000 kilos of liquid oxygen required for launch as well as production costs, which amounted to 300 million pounds.

With its abolition, Britain lost the nuclear power on which it relied. Therefore, Macmillan began new negotiations with Eisenhower at Camp David on March 29, 1960. He asked Eisenhower to provide him with nuclear weapons, and the latter agreed to sell the Sky bolt missile, which was in the process of being manufacturing. The agreement was finalized in June 1960 and provided for the sale of the missile, which would be compatible with the type of combat launchers (Combat Launchers) to the Royal Air Force, due to the desire of the United States to help reduce costs to Britain and agreed to grant all facilities to the Macmillan government in accessing all phases of the project with the payment of its costs in 1965, because the project is in its early stages<sup>(61)</sup>.

Macmillan agreed to grant the United States of America a base for Polaris submarines in the Scottish Holy Loch, and the danger of this agreement is that it is linked with the Skybolt agreement, meaning the sale of weapons in exchange for granting a base for submarines<sup>(62)</sup>, but on November 21, 1962 the Minister of American Defense Robert Macnamara announced the cancellation of the Skybolt missile agreement, and Kennedy agreed to the decision, but on condition that

(59)Welch , Op. Cit., P.9 .

(60)Williams,Op.Cit,P.361.

(61)Foreign Relations Of the United State 1958 – 1960, Vol. VIII, National security policy, Arms Control and Disamentt, Memorandum from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, Camp David 29 March 1960, P.864-865.

(62)Donette Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear weapons, Macmillan Press, London, 2000, P.45.



Macmillan be consulted in order to inform him of the reasons for the cancellation.

On December 11, McNamara met with the British Defense Secretary Peter Croft to continue the discussion they had started on November 9 regarding the cancellation of the Skybolt missile agreement, which America stated that the reason for the cancellation was its high budget and that it had failed several tests. The cancellation constituted a crisis of confidence between the two countries, as historians described it as the most serious crisis after the Suez crisis, but because of the close relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan, the crisis was quickly resolved at the Nassau Meeting, which was held from December 18-21, 1962 in The Bahamas, continuing the talks between the two defense ministers of the two countries regarding replacing the Skybolt with a Polaris missile. The meeting was attended by Duncan Sandys, Peter Thorncoft, Alec Home and David Ormsby. The American delegation consisted of McNamara and David Bruce<sup>(63)</sup>. Macmillan began talking about the history of the special relationship between the two countries and the nuclear cooperation during World War II. Macmillan sought to restore the special relationship after Suez Crisis He stated that "the United States has an obligation to provide Britain with a nuclear weapon if the Sky missile fails"<sup>(64)</sup>.

At the end of the meeting, Kennedy agreed to sell the Polaris missile without warheads, and Britain was to produce the warheads and submarines, and also suggested that work with the Skybolt should continue with the cost shared by 50% for both countries and that the nuclear forces become part of NATO forces<sup>(65)</sup>. After the crisis ended, the reaction of the press varied between supporters and opponents, as some newspapers criticized Macmillan's insistence on possessing nuclear power, and some newspapers described the act of the United States as treason<sup>(66)</sup>.

(63) Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and Nato Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962 - 68, Routledge, London, 2000, P.18. William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1964.

(64) Ashton, Op. Cit, P. 169.

(65) John Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations to 1939 – 1980 The special Relationship, Macmillan press, London, 1981, P.88, 103.

(66) Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Defense Relations In The Twentieth Century, Macmillan Press, London, 1998, P.129.



For Macmillan, it is a great victory, because the crisis did not affect his relationship with his friend Kennedy<sup>(67)</sup>, and the next day after the meeting ended, a successful test was conducted for the Skybolt missile, but did not affect the decision of the United States<sup>(68)</sup>.

### Conclusion

Macmillan succeeded in putting an end to the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States of America through a visit to Moscow and bringing the two countries closer together regarding the situation in Berlin.

Macmillan had a good relationship with the United States of America which played an effective role in bringing Britain back a strong country by possessing nuclear weapons. By his efforts, the Polaris weapon was purchased from the United States of America, and Britain became a strong influence in international relations. Macmillan also had a role in resolving the Berlin crisis, even it was temporarily.

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(68)Fisher ,Op.Cit ,P.304.





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